We contribute to the growing literature on the behavior of capital flow surges and their relationships with sudden stops and capital flow reversals. We suggest a definition of true sudden stops based on gross foreign flows that is a subset of net capital flow reversals. We find that a majority of surges end in reversals of some type and this 
THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CAPITAL FLOW SURGES, REVERSALS AND SUDDEN STOPS

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Large rapid inflows and outflows of capital have become a prominent and often disruptive feature of the international financial landscape. Since the dramatic episodes of capital surges and subsequent outflows associated with the Mexican and Asian crises in the 1990s, this subject has attracted considerable attention from researchers and policy makers.
The most widespread perception of these phenomena appears to be that of significant increases in foreign capital inflows followed by sharp and sudden decreases.
There has been considerable research on the statistical properties of these inflows and outflows. However, much of the literature on this topic has used measures that conflate the behavior of domestic and foreign capital by focusing on "net" capital flows and referring to any large shift in these flows as being "sudden stops".
More recent studies, however, have pointed out that true sudden stops should reflect the behavior of foreign investors only and that this is not adequately captured by the behavior of net capital flows. Thus it has been found important to distinguish between the behavior of foreign investors and domestic residents. Calderon and Kubota (2013) , Rothenberg and Warnock (2011) , Forbes and Warnock (2012) and Cavallo et al. (2013) have all found that a number of episodes that have been labeled sudden stops based on the behavior of net flows have been dominated by capital flight by domestic residents. 1 However, these recent studies have not explored the relationship between capital flow surges and sudden stops, the relationship that is foremost in many popular discussions.
In this paper we attempt to fill this gap by drawing on the recent focus on distinguishing among net and gross flows to investigate the relationships among capital flow surges and reversals. The terminology used to identify extreme behavior of capital flows can be confusing at times. The terms sudden stop and capital flow reversal have often been used interchangeably in the literature. In this study we propose to use these terms to identify different aspects of capital flows. More specifically, we use capital flow reversals as an inclusive term for all major negative changes in net capital flows. Thus reversals can reflect the behavior of both foreign and domestic investors. We define sudden stops as a subset of reversals associated with the behavior only of foreign investors as measured by gross foreign capital flows. We pay particular attention to sudden stops that follow previous surges of capital inflows from abroad as we believe that it is such cases that reflect what is often meant by sudden stops in policy discussions. 2 We also consider a number of different definitions of capital flow surges that have been used in the recent literature. We have found these to differ substantially across different studies (see Crystalin et al. (2014) ). As with other recent studies we find that the behavior of domestic investors is quite important at times and that large capital flow reversals are often not associated with previous capital flow surges regardless of whether 1 Other studies stressing the need to distinguish between net and gross flows are Bluedorn et al. (2013) , Ghosh et al. (2014) , and Janus and Riera-Crichton (2013) . 2 We discuss in the body of the paper other efforts to distinguish among different categories of net flows. the surges are measured on a net or gross basis. Thus concerns about instabilities in capital flows should not focus on the behavior of foreign investors only.
We do find that surges whether measured on a net or gross basis are associated with a substantially increased probability of sudden stops or reversals. Over half of the surges identified ended with sudden stops or capital flow reversals. We also find that the probability of sudden stops is greater when surges are measured on a gross rather than net basis.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses several issues involved in defining and measuring capital flow surges, reversals and sudden stops.
Section 2 presents our empirical results and section 4 discusses implications for policy and directions for further research.
MEASURING SURGES, REVERSALS, AND SUDDEN STOPS
Data for international capital flows typically comes from the financial account of the balance of payments statistics. In the early literature capital flows were measured on a net basis, including both the asset and liability sides of the financial account, and a significant decrease in this net balance was generally referred to as a sudden stop following the focus on this phenomena by economists such as Calvo (1998) and Dornbusch et al. (1995) . Later research highlighted the fact that both capital inflows and outflows could be generated by transactions of domestic residents as well as foreign investors. This gave rise to efforts to distinguish between the behavior of domestic and foreign investors using the available data on changes in assets and liabilities. These have been generally referred to as gross as opposed to net flows.
3 When the concern is with potential instabilities generated by the behavior of foreign investors, surges and sudden stops should be measured by the gross flows of foreign investors. On the other hand, recent research has shown that domestic residents can also account for large shift in capital flows.
This led Forbes and Warnock (2012) to distinguish among four types of large capital movements: surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment, with the first two categories referring to the behavior of foreign investors and the latter two to the behavior of domestic residents. Cavallo et al. (2013) provide the most complete taxonomy of the various types of relationships among foreign, domestic, and net capital flows during large events, going beyond the valuable distinctions among capital flow surges, 4 stops, flight and retrenchment delineated by Forbes and Warnock (2012) . Unfortunately from the perspective of using labels that coincide with normal usage of the language, Cavallo et al.
(2013) label all of the different combinations as types of sudden stops.
We believe it is more useful to label these as capital flow reversals with sudden stops being a sub category of reversals. Cavallo et al. (2013) label a sharp increase in capital outflows from domestic residents under their broad category of sudden stops which surely conflicts with normal usage. We agree with Rothenberg and Warnock (2011) who refer to the need to identify episodes "in the way the literature defines them in words" (p509). They emphasize the difference between what they call "true" sudden stops and sudden flights. Their operationalization of their true sudden stop measure is 3 The generally available data gives assets and liabilities only on a net basis however. So we only have net gross flows. Thus we cannot identify the gross inflows and outflows of residents and foreign investors. 4 Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) Cowan et al. (2007) , we further investigate the extent to which reversals are primarily foreign driven, domestic investor driven, or mixed.
As indicated in the introduction one purpose of this paper is to define the terms sudden stops and reversals and the empirical measures of them in ways that more clearly conform to their use in general discussion. We define the net capital flow reversals as where both domestic and foreign investors are involved in the capital movements. We use the term sudden stops to refer to the behavior only of foreign investors' gross capital 5 In other cases sudden stops may be accompanied by inflows of domestic capital making the net reversals smaller than the gross ones.
flows. Also, an important subset of sudden stops is identified as the group of sudden stops that are preceded by capital flow surges. Contrary to popular perceptions, however, we find that these narrowly defined surge and sudden stop episodes account for only a minority of large capital flow reversals. We also explore the frequency of other types of reversals.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We use annual data for 46 emerging market countries from 1980 to 2010. (2011) and Zhao et al. (2014) . 8 Studies used several additional criterions for measuring capital flow reversals and sudden stops. Calvo et al. (2004) required the capital account surplus and in the previous year and Cavallo and Frankel (2008) defined reversals if a country experiences a negative economic growth in the same or following year. Honig (2008) and Hutchison, Noy and Wang (2010) use additional criterion of sudden stop which is that an economy to have current account deficit improvement in the same year or in the following year of a sudden stop. Kim (2013) used these additional criterions to calculate the sudden stops and reversals, and he showed that the numbers of episodes are slightly different but these methods capture over 90% of the same episodes. Thus, in this paper we focus on the basic requirement which is the change in capital flows are greater than three percent of GDP. A number of additional methods have also been used in the literature. For a recent survey see Efremidze et al. (2011) .
While presenting results based on a simple measure of reversals and sudden stops, we choose to provide a more comprehensive look to the surge measures. This is mainly because the literature on surges of capital flows is very new. Crystalin et al. (2014) survey and examine the definitions of capital flow surges that have been used in the recent literature and find that there are substantial differences in the number of surges identified by the different methods. Appendix B provides the definitions of seven surge measures that are used in the following sections.
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We find that the largest number of episodes identified was almost three times the lowest number of episodes identified. Using the same dataset, in this study, we begin by investigating whether these different surge methods also lead to differences in the proportions of surges that end in reversals and sudden stops.
Surges Increase the Likelihood of Reversals
There are many reasons to expect that capital surges are likely to increase the probability of sudden stops. To the extent that capital flows to emerging markets are generated by cyclical conditions in the advanced economies, capital that flows into emerging markets from advanced economies when liquidity is loose will likely be reversed as credit conditions tighten in the advanced economies. Large capital inflows may also generate conditions in the receiving countries that make large reversals more likely. Surges in capital inflows may lead to currency appreciation under flexible rates or monetary expansion under flexible rates which lead to a worsening of current account balances.
10
This in turn makes countries more vulnerable to currency crises and capital flow reversals. In the spirit of second generation currency crisis models Montiel (2013) provides a model in which such current account worsening can interact with currency mismatches, large short term debt and low reserves to create multiple equilibria, thus allowing a likely shift from a good (capital boom) to a bad (sudden stop) equilibrium.
In addition, factors emphasized in the behavioral finance and complexity economics literatures suggest the possibility that internal dynamics may contribute to boom-bust episodes in capital flows in a way similar to what many believe occur at times in stock markets. 11 As both Fama (2014) and Shiller (2014) note, discussions of speculative bubbles are often poorly specified, but this doesn't mean that such phenomena do not exist. As Shiller stresses bubbles do not require wildly irrational behavior.
Typically bubbles and surges begin with new developments that do call for substantial adjustments. The bubble like behavior begins when such adjustments are pushed too far.
In many cases imperfect incentive structures generate private incentives to follow strategies of herding and excessive risk taking.
Furthermore, actors are typically operating with limited information in the face of complex uncertainties. Thus it is not surprising that they may be herding in the use of the 10 Of course most countries have the ability to a least partially offset such direct effects through, for example, sterilized intervention, although factors such as political pressures may often keep them from doing so. Amri et al. (2014) find that capital flow surges are linked to credit booms considerably less frequently than is often assumed. 11 Agosin and Huaita (2011) apply Minsky's theory to capital flow booms and reversals, while Efremidze et al. (2014) provide a broader analysis that draws also on complexity economics and other aspects of behavioral finance. Of course, the possibility of speculative bubbles is still challenged by some believers in efficient markets, see for example Eugene Fama's Nobel lecture (2014) . Support for the possibility of bubbles is gaining ground among economists, however. See, for example, Robert Shiller's Nobel lecture (2014).
"lenses" or "mental models" through which situations are viewed. Switches from surges to reversals can reflect shifts from focusing primarily on the positive factors to emphasis on the negative ones. Such behaviorally biased changes in perceptions of the most important fundamentals can cause shifts in capital flows much larger than would be expected from rational responses on actual changes in the fundamentals. In other words, on top of potentially rational behavior under uncertainty, psychological biases such as collective mood swings from optimism to pessimism could generate and/or amplify swings from capital surges to reversals.
Most often, however, we expect that rather than pure mood shifts, transitions from surges to sudden stops are generated by developments that cause reevaluations of positive and negative fundamentals. This was the case for much of the contagion surrounding the Asian crisis in 1997, where the Thai crisis caused investors and borrowers to reevaluate the risks of substantial currency depreciations and the health of financial sectors in a number of other Asian countries. 12 This was a classic case of a wakeup call that caused market participants to realize that they had been operating with a false mental model or balancing of positive and negative fundamentals.
Thus we have many possibilities to explain occasional rapid shifts from large capital inflows to large outflows. It is also important to recognize, as Shiller (2014) emphasizes, that not all bubbles end in crashes. This is also true of surges and large reversals, hence suggesting that some of such non-sudden-stop type surges may also have had bubble type elements.
13
12 See, for example, Willett et al. (2004b) . 13 Efficient market type explanations are also possible. Portfolio theory suggests that in the face of expected improved risk-return properties of an asset we should primarily observe stock adjustments rather than large
In Table 1 , we present the numbers of surges identified by the various methods arranged in the order of the number of episodes that they identify. These range from 59 to 185 episodes based on gross capital flows and from 71 to 193 based on net capital flows.
Despite these wide ranges the average numbers of surges identified under the two measures do not differ greatly, being 108 for gross flows and 115 for net flows. There is also a little difference in the number of sudden stops identified for gross flows, 145, and reversals of net flows, 150.
The proportions of surges that end in either of the outflow definitions vary much less than the numbers of surges identified by the various methods. These range from 55.9 to 74.6 percent for sudden stops and 49.2 to 59.2 for reversals with averages of 65.7 and 53.6 percent, respectively. One implication is that policy makers in capital receiving countries should pay particular attention to surges in gross foreign flows as these are more likely to end in sudden stops than are surges in net flows.
While these calculations suggest that the popular view that capital flow surges increase the probability of sudden stops and reversals is correct, the relationship is weaker than is often assumed.
As we expected there is a tendency for the surge methods that identify fewer surges to be associated with a higher proportion of sudden stops and reversals since these methods identify the episodes with largest capital inflows, but the relationship isn't a simple linear one. The difference between the two methods which identify the fewest and the most surges is quite substantial, 74.6 percent compared to 56.2 percent for gross continuing flows. Since the stock adjustment element may involve substantial lags for some types of international flows such flows could continue for some time before portfolios and loan books are fully reallocated, after which large capital inflows would cease.
flows and 59.2 percent to 49.2 percent for net flows. These results suggest that officials should use more than one definition to identify surges and perhaps develop a metric that combines several of them.
We also calculate percentages based on whether there is a sudden stop or reversal within the following two years. It seems reasonable, that there might be some lag between the end of a surge and a reversal. Naturally the percentages go up, but not by as much as one might expect. For gross flows the average percent that end in sudden stops rises only from 65.7 percent to 68.4 percent. The rise for net flows is somewhat greater, from 53.6 to 60.0 percent. The modest increases in probabilities suggest that if a surge is not followed by a sudden stop or reversal in the first year, then there is still a possibility of such an event in the second year, but the likelihood is lower.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Duration of Surges
Another interesting set of questions involves the typical length of surges and whether longer surges are more or less likely to be followed by sudden stops or reversals. These issues are addressed in Tables 2 and 3 . To keep the numbers manageable, we report only the averages from the different methods. In Table 2 we report the proportions of surges of different lengths for both gross and net surges. We find quite similar patterns of duration for both types with roughly sixty percent lasting only one year and twenty percent lasting two years. 14 The proportions continue to drop as longer surges are considered, with less than ten percent lasting more than three years.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
In Table 3 we also report the percentages of eventual reversals of surges of different lengths. Consistent with Table 1 we find that the probability of reversals is substantially higher for gross than net surges for all duration lengths. We find that two year surges are more likely to be reversed than those that last only one year, with the percentages rising from 56 to 76 percent for gross flows and from 31 to 47 percent for net flows. 15 As we move to three year surges there is somewhat lower tendency for the probability of gross surges to end in sudden stops and even lower likelihood for net surges to end in reversals. Four year surges are less likely to be reversed than two or three year surges, but slightly more likely than one year surges. However, the number of four year surges is sufficiently low for statistical purposes, thus we put little weight on these last results.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
14 For an analysis of the length of surges using duration or survival analysis see Molnar et al. (2013) . On the analysis of the duration of crises see Mecagni et al. (2007) . Furceri et al. (2012) find that most reversals only last one year, but about a quarter of them last three years or more. 15 Using a different methodology Agosin and Huaita (2012) also find that the probability of reversals increases for longer surges. 16 We also calculate the average after dropping the highest and lowest values. The results are very similar with those using the total values.
Many Reversals Are Not Related to Previous Surges
Another important finding is that a substantial proportion of sudden stops and reversals are not related to prior surges. Recent arguments by economists such as Agosin and Huaita (2011) have challenged what they consider to be the traditional view that most capital flow reversals are due to policy failures of the recipient countries. They argue instead that "capital inflow booms ... are the ultimate cause of capital account crises, or sudden stops" (p664). Our analysis also stresses the importance of capital flow surges in generating reversals but we do not find them to be as dominant a cause as Agosin and Huaita (2011) argue. Some of our disagreement comes down to the meaning of "usually"
in their statement that "...capital account crises, or sudden stops, are usually caused by capital surges..." (p670). Table 4 shows that on average just over half of sudden stops were not preceded by surges. We believe this finding strains the common meaning of usually. On the other hand these percentages vary a good deal with the methods of calculating surges, ranging from 28 to almost 70 percent. With the higher numbers it would seem reasonable to use the term usually.
For net flows the proportion of reversals not related to prior surges is even higher with a range from 36.7 to 72 percent and an average of 59.4. Thus it is clear that avoiding capital flow surges is not a sufficient condition for avoiding disruptive sudden stops and capital flow reversals.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The Roles of Domestic and Foreign Investors
Recent literature has appropriately pointed out that it is important to consider the behavior of domestic as well as foreign capital. While the most popular image is of capital flow reversals being generated by foreign investors, this is far from always being the case. In the 1960s and 70s considerable attention was given to problems of capital flight from developing countries. As many countries began to adopt more prudent economic policies and international capital mobility increased it is not surprising that attention began to focus more strongly on the behavior of foreign investors.
In Table 5 and Figure 1 , we see that foreign investors have been the predominant force in a majority of capital flow reversals, but that domestic investors lead in a sufficiently large minority of cases that it would be dangerous to ignore them. The last In Table 6 , we see that for net reversals for the total period in 96 cases the net reversals are greater than the gross reversals while in 54 cases the gross reversal were greater than the net. This suggests that while on average domestic investors change behavior in the same direction as foreign investors in a substantial minority of cases they act to partially offset the behavior of foreign investors. We also see that the proportion of offsetting cases has been increasing over time. While the ratio is 11 to 23 in the 1980s it rises to 28 to 35 in the 2000s.
Interestingly with sudden stops in gross foreign capital flows the ratio is reversed with the changes in gross flows exceeding those in net flows by a substantial margin, 111
to 34. This ratio has also been increasing over time, going from 25 to 12 in the 1980s to 46 to 9 in the 2000s.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
We also find that in some episodes the differences between the behavior of domestic and foreign investors are so great that the net and gross flows actually move in opposite directions. Table 7 shows that this occurred in 28 out of 150 net reversals and 25 out of 145 gross reversals.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
To investigate further the relative roles of domestic and foreign investors in capital flow reversals, we follow Cowan et al. (2007) and Calderon and Kubota (2013) and classify reversals as being largely foreign driven or largely domestic driven or mixed.
They define foreign driven sudden stops as where the change of foreign flows over total flows is greater than 75%; domestic driven episodes are when that amount is less than 25%; and. mixed episodes are where ratio is in between 25% to 75%. As shown in Table   8 , we find that roughly 60 percent of the reversals were foreign driven, almost 23 percent were domestic driven and 18 percent were mixed. 17 However, when we consider reversals that were preceded by surges the proportion that were foreign driven raises to 73.8 percent, while only 53.7 percent of non-surge related reversals were foreign driven.
It shows that when reversals are preceded by surges they are more likely to be driven by foreign investors.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
Looking at the results by decades in Table 9 , we see that foreign investors have been a consistently important source of capital flow reversals in emerging markets for the past three decades. On the other hand, while the numbers of domestic driven episodes were always lower than foreign driven ones, they increased substantially since the 1980s.
Interestingly both here and in Table 4 we find little change between the 1990s and 2000s.
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE
Some Factors That Contribute to Reversals and Sudden Stops
It is important for policy makers to know that there is a substantial probability that capital flow surges will be reversed. Many surges are not reversed, however, so it is important to investigate the factors that make particular surges more likely to be reversed. 18 A substantial investigation of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper but we wish to report that our preliminary research suggests that an important consideration is the size of current account deficits. 19 Figure 2 shows that as current account deficits grow beyond three percent of GDP, the probabilities of both reversals in net flows and sudden stops of foreign flows begin to increase substantially.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
18 See Broto et al. (2011) , for example, for the factors that affect the volatility of various types of capital flows. For theoretical discussion of key factors generating capital flow surges and reversals, including the role of factors emphasized in the literature on behavioral finance, see the analysis and references in Huaita (2011), Calvo et al. (2008) , Efremidze, Rutledge, and Willett (2014) and Montiel (2013) . 19 Econometric studies also find the current account to have a major influence on reversals. See the analysis and references in Agosin and Huaita (2011) . Agosin and Huaita argue that current account deficits are endogenous to capital surges so that they are not a basic causal factor in reversals. This correspondence is considerably less than one to one, however, so that the size of current account deficits can add additional information on the probability of a reversal.
probabilities of reversals. It is commonly argued that while direct investment flows can be subject to sudden stops and reversals, this is much less likely than for other types of flows (see, for example, Sula and Willett (2009) ). Theoretical literature has pointed to the potential instabilities of portfolio flows (see, for example, Calvo and Mendoza (2000)) but Willett et al. (2004a) found that the banking sector was by far the largest source of outflows during the Asian crises. Likewise Cavallo et al. (2013) found that the banking sector was the largest source of sudden stops and reversal episodes in their sample. Using a different methodology, we have found similar results (see Kim (2013) ).
20
In Figure 3 , we provide an example which shows the average proportions of different types of capital flows in surges of foreign inflows that did and did not end in sudden stops. Portfolio equity flows show only small differences, while bond flows rise from 21% in case of sudden stops to 31% in case of surges that do not end in sudden stops. As expected FDI shares show a large difference, rising from 31 percent in sudden stop cases to 46 percent for non-sudden-stops. The largest change is for the share of bank loans which rises from 14 percent in non-sudden-stop related surges to 38 percent for surges that do end in sudden stops. This clearly suggests that particular attention should be given to surges through the banking sector.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 20 See also Levchenko and Mauro (2007) and Bluedorn et al. (2013) . The latter find little difference between the short term volatility of bank related and portfolio flows, but we have argued that from a policy perspective such short term volatility is less important than large inward and outward flows of capital such as surges and reversals. See Sula and Willett (2009) .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our paper adds to the growing literature on the importance of disaggregating net capital flows and focusing on the interrelationship among large movements in capital flows resulting from the behaviors of both domestic and foreign agents. Our particular addition to this literature is our focus on the relationship between capital flow surges and reversals and sudden stops.
We argue, as have several recent papers, that true sudden stops should refer only to the behavior of foreign investors and that this is not adequately captured by the traditional focus on net capital flows. We suggest a definition of true sudden stops based on gross foreign flows that differs from what is in the current literature as a subset of net capital flow reversals and investigate the behavior of both of these types of measures.
We find that on average according to both types of measures a substantial proportion of capital flow surges end in sudden stops. We also find, however, that this surge-stop sequence is less frequent in a broader context which includes cases of stops that are not preceded by surges. While a majority of surges end in reversals of some type this percentage is only slightly over half of surges in net capital flows. The proportion of surges in gross foreign capital flows that end with large reversals or sudden stops is higher, although still less than 70 percent. Surprisingly, however, neither a majority of sudden stops or capital flow reversals are preceded by surges.
Thus while policy officials should pay more attention to surges in foreign (gross) than net flows, such surges are far from the only source of potentially disruptive shifts in capital flows. Nor are such reversals always caused primarily by foreign capital. Our results support recent papers stressing that the behavior of domestic investors should not be neglected.
Our analysis also suggests that it will be important to add the relationship between capital flow surges and reversals to the type of recent empirical studies that have investigated domestic and global factors affecting domestic and foreign capital flows.
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Basic international monetary theory suggests that the optimal policy responses to capital inflows that are expected to continue for a substantial period of time is to adjust to these flows either through currency appreciation under flexible rates or unsterilized intervention under fixed rates. The latter brings additional monetary expansion with a balance of payments surplus or less contraction with a deficit. This is the textbook adjustment mechanism for the gold standard.
On the other hand where the inflows are expected to be only temporary, sterilized intervention under either fixed or flexible rates is optimal. 22 This avoids temporary adjustments of the exchange rate or money supply which would then be reversed and resulting in reallocations of resources that would be generated. The implementation of such optimal policies of course requires knowledge of which inflows are temporary and which are long term. This cannot be known with certainty.
The theory of economic policy suggests that policy responses should be muted where there is uncertainty. This offers a rationale for leaning against the wind policies should vary with the expectations of the probabilities that inflows will be reversed. The types of analysis presented in this paper and other recent research begins to offer some basis for forming judgments of these probabilities and point to important directions for further policy relevant research. 
Surge2:
The method defines a surge when the ratio of capital inflows to GDP is greater than its HP-filter trend by at least one standard deviation or if the ratio is above the 75 th percentile of the whole-sample distribution. This method differs from the first method in that all calculations in the second method are based on the ratio of capital inflows to GDP, as used by Balakrishnan et al. (2013) .
Surge3: This method classifies inflows as a surge if the ratio to GDP exceeds the top 75 th percentile of the country's historical capital flows to GDP ratio provided that the flow is above the top 75 th percentile of the entire cross country sample (Ghosh et al., 2014) . This is the only method that uses full sample to identify surge episodes.
Surge4: Surges in this method are defined with inflows that exceed the sample mean by at least one standard deviation and the ratio of capital inflows to GDP is greater than 3 per cent (Agosin and Huaita, 2012) . Similar to the first method, the fourth method also uses the ratio of capital inflows to GDP to calculate the long run tendency and standard deviation.
Surge5:
This method codes an inflow as a surge when the ratio of inflows to GDP exceeds its trend (measured by HP-filter) by at least one standard deviation and the ratio is greater than 3% of GDP (Furceri, Guichard, and Rusticelli, 2012) . Following Caballero (2012) , this method uses population instead of GDP to normalize inflows. One benefit for using per capita concept is to eliminate conditions such as an increase in the ratio of inflows to GDP while inflows were actually decreasing but have been offset by a higher decrease in GDP. A surge is measured as an inflow per capita that exceeds its trend (measured by HP-filter) by at least one standard deviation and the capital flow to population ratio is positive. Although theoretically it is possible to have an increasing ratio while inflows were actually decreasing, our sample indicates out of 622 cases only three of them related to this case.
Surge6:
Surge7:
The first attempt to empirically identify a surge, of which we are aware of, was by Sula (2006) . 25 A surge measure is identified with a large and abrupt increase in capital inflows, and captures both -level and change effects of capital inflows. This method defines an inflow as a surge if the increase in capital inflows as a percentage of GDP over a 3-year period is greater than 3% and the value of inflows as a percentage of GDP in that year is greater than 3%. The rationale for not using a single year lag is that the capital inflows may increase suddenly in one year and continue to be very high for consecutive years without another abrupt increase. In such a case, if the surge is defined as a one-year difference in capital inflows, the measure will only detect the beginning of the surge but will miss the continuation. The second criterion ensures that the level of inflows is large enough relative to GDP. This condition allows us to filter out the episodes of sudden capital flow recoveries from previous large outflows to small inflows in the current year. 
